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Abstract: Networks can affect a group’s ability to solve a coordination problem. We utilize 
laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of subjects can solve 
coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also 
investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that 
network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most 
significantly, we find that increases in the number of network connections encourage 
coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the 
conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks.  
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Introduction 
 Social scientists have devoted enormous attention to understanding how real-world 
political actors can coordinate to solve collective problems. Much of this research focuses on 
situations in which actors must resolve a coordination problem that occurs within a network. 
Two areas in which coordination within a network are common in American politics are 
elections and policy implementation. In the electoral arena the ability of disaggregated 
individuals to coordinate on campaign strategy and fundraising affects the ability of a candidate 
to win elected office. Networks affect the adoption of coordinated policy solutions as well as the 
ability of disaggregated actors to coordinate on implementing policy solutions.  
To study how network structure affects coordination we embed game theoretic models of 
coordination into various network structures. The experimental setting allows us to vary network 
structure without changing anything else, thereby providing a causal test of how networks affect 
coordination games. The empirical literature on the effects of networks is largely unable to make 
causal claims because the network does not vary independently of other aspects that may affect 
behavior. Our experiments resolve this problem and allow us to make causal claims about how 
network structure affects group behavior.   
We find that when subjects have common, symmetric incentives to coordinate they can 
successfully achieve coordination regardless of network structure. However, with asymmetric 
incentives network structure significantly affects the ability of a group to coordinate –  networks 
with more connections facilitate coordination better than networks with fewer connections.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we briefly review the literature on 
coordination and networks. In section 2 we elaborate our model of coordination within a 
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network.  We present the specifics of our experimental design in section 3. In section 4 we 
analyze the results of our experiments and in section 5 we discuss and conclude.  
1. Literature Review 
Scholars of American politics have studied many situations in which coordination is 
affected by the interaction between decision makers. The underlying coordination games can be 
either symmetric or asymmetric. In symmetric games payoffs are equivalent across outcomes as 
long as coordination occurs. In asymmetric or impure coordination games payoffs are still 
contingent on successful coordination, but the payoff to each person differs as in the Battle of 
Sexes game. We now discuss two common types of coordination problems in American politics.   
Coordination problems frequently occur in electoral politics and policy making. Two 
examples from the electoral arena are decentralized scheduling of campaign functions and 
fundraising decisions. The need to coordinate campaign activity occurs because the scarcity of 
time creates an allocation problem. This fits the general condition Calvert (1992) identifies, “A 
common variety of impure coordination problem arises whenever a group must agree on how to 
allocate some fixed stock of value among themselves.” For example, consider a situation in 
which multiple political activists agree on the candidate they want to support, and they each 
desire to organize some type of campaign activity (fundraiser, voter registration/mobilization, 
canvassing, etc). The candidate’s supporters will want to coordinate the timing of the multiple 
events so that they are not all scheduled on the same day. If all the events are scheduled for the 
same day then attendees can only attend one event, even if they would be willing to attend 
multiple events. As a result, campaign activities may not be as effective as if they were spread 
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out among multiple days.
1
 Even though these activists all want the events to take place, they may 
disagree on whose event will occur first, second, third and so on. Therefore the organizers have 
an incentive to coordinate timing and the situation resembles an asymmetric coordination game. 
The process of communication reflects the existence of a network that determines how 
information spreads among the multiple actors.    
Another example from electoral politics is explained in Cox (1997) who considers how 
campaign donors decide to allocate their financial resources. Donors to the same party will likely 
have different preferences about which candidate they prefer, but they will also prefer that their 
party’s nominee win the general election. As it becomes clear who the front-runners are in a 
party’s primary, donors will have incentives to coordinate their activity to ensure that the 
candidate most likely to win in the general election emerges from the primary election. 
Coordination is facilitated by information about candidate characteristics, the activities of other 
donors, and how much time remains before the primary election. The information to facilitate 
coordination moves between different actors based on the connections, that is the network, 
between individuals.  
The relationship between network structure and coordination has been studied 
extensively by scholars interested in policy making (Heclo 1978; O’Toole 1997; Laumann and 
Knoke 1987). Policy makers share information among themselves, which can play a role in the 
ability to solve coordination problems in a decentralized fashion. Scholz, Berardo, and Kile 
(2008) find that cooperation among estuary management organizations depends on the network 
in which the organizations operate. In their view, a network is formed by connections between 
different organizations and the connections facilitate information flow about others’ actions, 
                                                 
1
 This is clearly a simplified example that includes a great many assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign 
activities, the behavior of activists and the absence of a central planning agent who can successfully solve the 
problem. Regardless, the example demonstrates a common form of coordination involving time constraints.  
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thereby improving collaboration. Policy actors that are highly connected to others are more likely 
to work together on policy implementation, suggesting that networks influence coordination. 
Likewise, Carpenter et al. (2004) show that network structure is both affected by and affects 
information flow between interest groups attempting to influence policy making. In particular, 
they conclude that when demand for information increases lobbying firms invest more resources 
in creating strong ties in their network, but that the resulting network actually impedes the 
distribution of information. Mintrom and Vergari (1998) find that network connections facilitate 
the spread of policy ideas between states. Policy entrepreneurs learn about policies and then 
propose similar policies (a form of coordination) based on information from the networks.
2
  
This empirical literature suggests that networks will have considerable affect on attempts 
to coordinate policy implementation. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw causal 
inferences about the effect of network structure on coordination from empirical research, because 
the networks are endogenous to the task (or behavior). In an experimental setting we can vary the 
network structure, while holding constant the coordination task subjects must complete, and 
therefore have a direct, causal test of the effect of networks on coordination.  
                                                 
2
 Coordination problems occur across a broad range of social phenomena ranging from solving 
common pool resource problem (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom and Keohane 1994; Ahn, Ostrom and 
Walker 2003); to electoral coordination (Cox 1997); to evolution of behavioral strategies 
(Axelrod 1984, 1997), to economic development and rule of law (Greif et al. 1994); to the 
development of social leadership (Calvert 1992); to political participation (McClurg 2003); to 
which side of the road we should drive on (Lewis 1969); to ending footbinding (Mackie 1996). 
At least as common as coordination problems in social settings are the presence of network 
effects in which the decisions of one actor affect the behavior or environment of other actors 
(Grannovetter 1973, 1974; Heclo 1978; Huckfedlt and Sprague 1987, 2006; Coleman 1988; 
Ostrom 1990; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Putnam 2000; Scholz, Berardo, and Kile 2008; 
Fowler 2006; Christakis and Fowler 2008 Watts 2003; see the various chapters in Kahler 2009). 
Again we simply provide a snippet of the literature that uses networks to understand behavior 
across a wide range of topics.  
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The most direct antecedent of our work is Kearns et al. (2006) who study the ability of a 
large group of human subjects to solve a symmetric coordination problem called the graph 
coloring problem.
3
 The basic task in the experiment we both utilize is to color the nodes of a 
network such that every node is a different color than its immediate neighbors.
4
 In the 
experiment subjects know the color choices of all their neighbors as well as the amount of time 
remaining in the experiment and how close the entire network is to completion. Subjects can 
freely change colors as often as they wish. Therefore, this set up is quite similar to a coordination 
game with communication. The authors find that groups of 38 subjects can quickly solve the 
coordination problem, and that an increase the number of connections leads to faster solution 
times. This result is consistent with the idea that communication can facilitate coordination. In 
this paper we build on Kearns et al.’s results and study how network structure affects the ability 
of subjects to solve both symmetric and asymmetric coordination games.  
2. Modeling Coordination in a Network 
 In this paper we embed two standard game theoretic models of coordination into a multi-
person, networked environment. To date there is little experimental research that combines game 
theory and networks.
5
 Our experiments and model build on Kearns et al.’s (2006) study of the 
                                                 
3
 Because coordination is a global phenomenon in the experiments we utilize it is at least partially analogous to 
some form of public goods games. See Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) for a discussion of public goods provision in 
a network setting.  
4
 The general problem they are studying is the graph coloring problem, which is a form of coordination problem. In 
this problem, there is a minimum number of colors needed to color successfully any given network referred to as 
that graph’s chromatic number. For instance, some graphs can be colored successfully with two colors and others 
with three colors and so no. The reported experiments utilized the minimum chromatic color for a given graph.  
5
 A good theoretical discussion about networks and game theory appears in Jackson (2008). For recent papers that 
study experimentally game theory and networks see Corbae and Duffy (2007), Charness and Jackson (2007) and 
Callander and Plott (2005). Most of these studies involve only a few number of actors (fewer than 6) and still 
involve one-shot decision making rather than the dynamic games we study in this experiment.  In addition, much of 
the research in experimental economics has focused on network formation rather than on the effect of different 
network structures, which is our focus.  
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graph coloring problem. Although the problem is conceptually simple it contains a number of 
interesting nuances that make it an appealing problem to study.
6
   
 First, the graph coloring problem is an example of coordination in a network making it 
analogous to the empirical examples that motive our interest in the paper.  The problem has been 
widely studied by computer scientists, both theoretically and via simulation (see Jensen and Toft 
1994 for a review of much of the graph coloring research). Second, for the two-colorable graphs 
we focus on there are good centralized algorithms for solving the problem, but the properties of 
distributed algorithms are not well understood. Our experiments utilize distributed problem 
solving because each human subject controls the color of only a single node in the network, so 
there is no centralized decision maker. The upshot of this is that we may be able to learn about 
good mechanisms to solve the graph coloring problem in a distributed fashion through human 
experiments. Third, the graph coloring problem is a dynamic problem in which subjects can 
change their choices as they learn about the choices of other actors in the game, which mirrors 
many real-world problems in which we change our actions as we observe the actions of others. 
We first outline the basic, static form of each game and then move to a discussion of the dynamic 
model. 
The basic, non-dynamic two person form of the symmetric coordination game is 
displayed in Figure 1 below. The payoff for individuals is identical whether they coordinate on 
action Red or Green in Figure 1. There are two Nash equilibria to this game either (Red, Green) 
or (Green, Red).  
Insert Figure 1 here 
                                                 
6
 The simplicity of the problem makes it ideal for human subject experiments because we can be confident that the 
subjects actually understand the task facing them during the experiment. 
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 As Kearns et al. (2006) showed, and as previous experimental results on coordination 
games with communication suggest, subjects can often solve this game. In the experimental set 
up subjects have a tremendous amount of information available to them as they play the 
coordination game. This experiment involves dynamic decision-making rather than one-shot 
decisions, which is the typical way coordination has been studied experimentally.  The dynamic 
nature of the game essentially turns the game we are studying from a one-shot coordination game 
without information into a coordination game with information. In the actual experiment subjects 
can change their color repeatedly until coordination is achieved, and they get tremendous 
information about their neighbors and feedback about how their actions affected the networks 
overall level of coordination. Therefore, we expect that human subjects can solve this symmetric, 
dynamic coordination game.  
 The second type of coordination game we utilized in these experiments is an asymmetric 
coordination game (such as a battle of the sexes). Again, subjects are only paid if coordination is 
achieved, but the payoff to a subject depends on the outcome. Figure 2 displays a general form of 
this game in which the bonus amount is a parameter that can be modified.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
 The key difference in the asymmetric coordination game is that although there are still 
two Nash Equilibiria (Red, Green) and (Green, Red) the actors now have a preference for which 
color they choose. In games of this type there is conflict over how coordination will occur. We 
view this as a more realistic and interesting form of coordination. In particular, in this type of 
game we expect network structure to have significant effects on whether or not global 
coordination is achieved. We turn now to a brief discussion of the dynamic nature of these 
games.  
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2.1 Dynamic Coordination 
 In the previous section we outlined a one-shot version of coordination games, but the 
actual model and the one we test experimentally is a highly dynamic game. In the dynamic 
model subjects can change their chose color repeatedly until the time limit is reached or 
coordination is achieved. The one-shot models in Figures 1 and 2 display the payoffs subjects 
receive if coordination is achieved before the time limit is reached. In the experiment actors can 
move asynchronously, and they learn about the choices of the nodes to which they are connected 
instantly. This turns the one-shot game into a dynamic game with communication.
 
Myerson 
(1991) demonstrates that in a coordination game with information (an analogous setting to the 
one we model here) there are an infinite number of equilibria. One implication of this is that we 
do not analyze whether or not subjects pursue equilibrium strategies because there are no bounds 
on what constitutes an equilibrium strategy.
 7,8
 Instead, our predictions and analysis are about a 
group’s ability to solve the coordination problem, but not about individual strategies.  
2.2 Combining coordination with network structure 
 The key aspect of our experimental design is the ability to test how different network 
structures affect coordination. In particular, we want to explore the relationship between the 
number of connections in a network and how long it takes for subjects to complete the 
coordination game under symmetric and asymmetric incentives. The core assumption in the 
following predictions is that networks facilitate information flow between actors and greater 
information flow (via network connections) will lead to faster solutions to the coordination 
                                                 
7
 We do not discuss the equilibrium properties of the dynamic game, because as Callander and Plott (2005) note 
“Strategic incentives within dynamic networks are little understood and a characterization 
of equilibrium is not available.” 
8
 Jackson and Watts (2008) demonstrate that here are equilibrium strategies in bipartite games where subjects both 
pick a partner and one action. However, our set up is fundamentally different because 1) subjects do not pick their 
partners, and 2) subjects can change their actions after the experiment begins.  
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problem. Our predictions are related to the interaction between network structure and incentive 
structure.  
Prediction 1: In the symmetric coordination games subjects will be able to solve all of the 
games, regardless of network structure. 
 
Prediction 2: In symmetric coordination games, more connections will lead to faster 
times for the subjects to achieve coordination. 
 
Prediction 3: Asymmetric coordination games will reduce the probability of a network 
being solved and increase the time for a solution compare to symmetric coordination 
games, holding the network constant. 
 
Prediction 4: In asymmetric coordination games, a greater number of connections will 
increase the probability that a network is solved and decrease the time it takes to 
coordinate.   
 
3. Experimental Design 
In all of the experiments reported in this paper we utilized the following experimental 
design. The networks consisted of 16 nodes (one per subject) and were able to be successfully 
colored using two colors. After subjects reported to the experiment they were placed at a 
computer behind partitions so that they could not see the other participants. Before the 
experiment began we read aloud the directions to all the subjects in the room to ensure that the 
procedures, rules, and incentives are all common knowledge. In addition, all subjects take a short 
quiz (with payment for correct answers) to make sure they understand the experiment.
9
  
To ensure that subjects did not repeatedly choose the same color over and over again 
(thereby possibly facilitating coordination), we used a palate of 10 colors and for each 
coordination game a subject was randomly given two of the ten possible colors. In addition, 
subjects in a given game chose from different colors to ensure that if they were able to see 
                                                 
9
 We utilize common instructions and quizzes in our experiment to ensure adherence or compliance with the 
protocol. This allows us to be confident that changes in our treatment (network structure and/or bonus amount) are 
understood by the subjects who receive the treatment.  
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another’s monitor the subject could not learn anything about how that subject was acting. The 
central server presented each subject’s terminal with two different colors that a subject could 
choose for his or her node in each round. The information displayed on each computer was 
controlled by our central server that utilized a software program developed and shared by 
Michael Kearns and Stephen Judd and the University of Pennsylvania. 
Each experimental group took part in approximately 30 attempts to solve various 
coordination games.  The baseline payment for coordination was $1 per subject and groups had 
three minutes to achieve coordination. Each experimental trial ends either when the time limit is 
reached or the group achieves coordination successfully, and this is known to all subjects in the 
experiment.  
In the experiment each subject controls the color of one node in the network so 
coordination is the result of distributed actions. However, subjects do have more information 
than just the color of their own node. The screen that subjects saw during the experiment 
contained the following information. 
 Local View: Subjects are able to see their node and the neighboring nodes to which 
they are connected. Each node in their local neighborhood contains a number in its 
center that tells the subject how many total edges a neighboring node has. This allows 
them to see the color they have chosen for their node as well as the colors chosen by 
their neighbors 
 Color choices: subjects can see the two colors from which they can choose 
 Elapsed Time Bar: This bar kept track of the amount of time since the session began, 
and allows subjects to determine how much time is remaining before the time limit. 
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 Completion Percentage Bar: This bar provides information about how close the entire 
network is to completion. The percent completed represents the number of edges 
without a coloring conflict divided by the total number of edges in the graph.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 During the actual experiment the bars for elapsed time and completion percentage are 
updated in real time. Figure 3 displays a typical screen shot that a subject sees before the 
experiment begins. By looking at the screen a subject with this picture can determine that he is 
connected to three nodes and that one of those nodes has eight total connections (and the other 
two nodes each have three total connections. The subject can also see that he can choose between 
pink and violet during this session and he will receive a normal payoff of $1 if the network is 
colored successfully and he ends up as pink, and he will receive $4 if the network is colored 
successfully and he ends up as violet when the session ends.  During the experiment subjects 
continue to see this screen shot, but the progress bar and elapsed time bars change to reflect the 
global condition of the network.  
 The screen shot shows that although subjects have a tremendous amount of information 
available to them during the experiment, they do not know the structure of the entire network nor 
do they know who their geographic neighbors are in the experiment. In addition, subjects are 
assigned to their node randomly at the beginning of each session within a given experiment. 
Therefore, even if they discover to whom they are connected in a given session that will only last 
for one session. This procedure ensures subjects do not always occupy the same position in a 
network when we repeat network structures with different bonus parameters. Because subjects 
do not know the entire structure of the network they are not able to learn anything about how 
their choices relate to the group’s success or failure for a given network type.  
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3.1 What Networks Do We Study? 
 The goal of our experiment is to understand how network structure affects group 
coordination, and therefore we had to determine the networks to study. We report the results of 
our research on five different network structures. For the sake of understanding we called the 
networks: zero-chord cycle, 6-chord cycle, barbell, cylinder and leader. In Figure 4 below we 
present a visual representation of each of the different networks. 
 We chose these networks because each of them is a representation of some real-world 
type of network that we want to study. For instance, the zero chord (or simple cycle) network 
might represent a situation in which connections are purely geographic and people do not interact 
with anyone other than their local neighbors. The 6 chord cycle adds a few connections across 
the cycle, but retains the basic cycle structure. The Leader network is built from the simple cycle, 
but includes two nodes that are highly connected to other members of the network. To retain two 
colorability, one leader is connected to each odd member and the other leader to each even 
member. The barbell network consists of two simple cycles with eight nodes joined by a single 
link between the cycles. This might be similar to networks with only a few ties between groups 
such as political parties or racial groups. The Cylinder network is similar to the barbell in that 
there are 2 cycles, but in the cylinder every person in the two cycles is connected to a member of 
the other eight-person cycle.  
3.2 Information Flow in a Network 
The network’s primary role in this model is to transfer information throughout the 
network about the actions/decisions of other nodes.  To order the networks based on their 
connections we use the average nodal degree of a network, which is defined as the sum of each 
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node’s degree divided by the total number of nodes (Knoke and Yang 2008).  The average nodal 
degree of each network is presented in Table 1.  
3.3 Incentive Structures Utilized During Experiment 
 We utilized the two general (symmetric and asymmetric) payoff structures as we 
described in Figures 1 and 2. In both types of payoff structure subjects were only paid if global 
coordination was achieved. The baseline payment was $1 for successful coordination, which we 
augments with bonus amounts of $1, $2, $3, and $4 to create asymmetric incentives. Before each 
time that we changed the bonus amount we read subjects a brief description of the new bonus 
amount and how it would be implemented. Additionally, the first time the subjects were exposed 
to the bonus rounds they took a quiz to ensure they understood how bonuses operated. Our 
Prediction 4 (above) is that networks will respond differently to the imposition and level of 
asymmetry.  
4. Data Analysis and Results 
 Our experiment employs both within and between subject designs. In all of our 
experiments subjects take part in trials that involve symmetric and asymmetric games and that 
involve multiple network structures. However, we cannot rely solely on within group analysis 
because we cannot conduct enough trials with one group of subjects to explore all the relevant 
combinations of networks and levels of asymmetry. Furthermore, we want different groups to 
attempt the same networks and bonus structures so we can ensure that our results are not due to 
one group of idiosyncratic subjects.  
A first cut at the data is shown in Table 2 where we present the relationship between 
bonus ratio and successful network coordination across all of the network structures we utilize. 
These results strongly support Prediction 1 that under symmetric incentives (asymmetry level 
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equals 0) subjects will be able to solve the networks. There is only one instance out of 19 trials 
with symmetric incentives where subjects fail to complete successfully the coordination problem. 
We also include in this table the average time spent on all of the networks across the five 
different levels of asymmetry. These averages include instances in which the network is not 
solved, which are counted as lasting for 180 seconds, which clearly biases the average time 
downwards for networks in which many of the graphs are not solved. Increases in the bonus ratio 
are associated with less coordination and longer times for successful coordination. 
 We combine number of connections, bonus structure and time spent solving a network in 
Figure 5 that presents the average amount of time to solve a given combination of network and 
bonus amount.
10
 The figure allows us to explore predictions 2, 3 and 4 by examining 
comparisons along the x-, y- and z-axes in the figure. We start by focusing on the observations 
where the bonus ratio is zero, which allows us to examine Prediction 2. As we predicted, 
networks with fewer connections (on the left of the x-axis) take longer to solve than networks 
with more connections under the symmetric incentive condition.  
To examine Prediction 3 about the effect of asymmetric coordination games on time to 
achieve coordination we can move along the z-axis from a bonus amount of zero to a bonus 
amount of four dollars, within a given network in the figure. Doing so reveals that there is a 
general increase in the average time to coordinate as we move from symmetric to asymmetric 
games. Prediction 4 is that networks with higher connectivity will take less time than networks 
with lower connectivity, when compared at similar bonus structures. We can see this result by 
comparing the amount of time it takes for coordination within a given bonus ratio, but across 
                                                 
10
 We include networks that were not successfully solved, which receive a value of 180000 milliseconds although in 
fact it would have taken longer than 180000 milliseconds for these networks to be solved. Therefore, some 
combinations of networks and bonus structures that were often not solved will have artificially low average solution 
times.  
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network structures. For example, if we focus on the networks with a bonus ratio of four we see 
that the amount of time it takes for a group to coordinate increases as we progress from the 
highest connected leader network to the least connected zero-chord network. The same general 
pattern is true across the different bonus structures. 
 We build on the simple descriptive results presented in the previous tables and figure by 
utilizing a logit model and a Cox proportional hazard model to test the effect of the bonus and 
network structure on successful coordination and time until coordination.  
We focus first on the logit model. To test the effect of network structure on coordination 
we include a counter for the session number within each experimental group, a dummy variable 
for each network, a dummy variable for whether the given session was an asymmetric game, a 
variable for the level of asymmetry, and a variable for the interaction between the level of 
asymmetry and the network structure.
11
 This is analogous to a dosage-response study in which 
we want to understand both the effect of the treatment (asymmetry) and the dosage of the 
treatment (the magnitude of the asymmetry).  In addition to the treatment variables we include a 
fixed effect for each group that participated in the experiment to account for any group-level 
characteristics that affect successful coordination. Our Prediction 4 is that networks with higher 
connectivity will be solved more often in the asymmetric condition than networks with lower 
connectivity. We also estimate a parameter to account for learning effects by counting the first 
trial in an experiment as 0 and counting upwards until we reach the end of that day’s trials.12  
We expect to find that the interaction between bonus ratio and network structure depends 
on the number of connections in the network. Referring back to Table 1 where we listed the 
                                                 
11
 To further test for learning we looked for serial correlation within each experimental group by regressing the time 
it took for each session against a counter variable for the session, and then tested for 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 3
rd
 order serial 
correlation using Durbin-Watson’s alternative test. We could never reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  
12
 We typically ran about 30 sessions with a given group of subjects. This is an admittedly crude way to account for 
learning within the experiment, but it will account for general learning.  
17 
 
average degree of network we would generally classify the zero chord and barbell network as 
low connectivity and the other three networks as relatively high connectivity.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
In Table 3 we present the results of our logit analysis. The excluded network in the 
analysis is the leader network, and therefore the dummy variables for each network and the 
interaction between the dummy variables and the asymmetry level should be interpreted relative 
to the leader network. The level of asymmetry variable that is not interacted with a network 
variable is the effect of changes in asymmetry in the leader network. We turn now to the result of 
the analysis. There is not a main effect of asymmetry on the probability of coordination as 
indicated by the insignificance of the asymmetry variable. The zero-chord and barbell networks 
are both solved less often as asymmetry increases relative to the leader network. The six chord 
network is statistically indistinguishable from the leader network, but the cylinder network is 
solved successfully less often than the leader network as asymmetry increases. These results 
demonstrate that networks with more connections facilitate the ability of groups to solve 
asymmetric coordination games.  
Another way to study successful network completion is to utilize a Cox proportional 
hazard model, which allows us to study the time until the network is solved. (Box-
Steffensmeister and Jones 2004). We use the same variables as in the logit analysis. We again 
exclude the leader network as this has the highest level of connectivity of the networks.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
 Table 4 presents the estimated hazard ratios from the Cox regression. A hazard ratio less 
than one implies that a given variable makes coordination less likely to happen given that it has 
not already occurred, whereas a hazard ratio greater than one means the variable makes 
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coordination more likely to happen. Based on Predictions 3 and 4 we expect to see that the effect 
of asymmetry depends on network structure.  To improve interpretation we generate predicted 
hazard ratios for each combination of network and asymmetry.  
 In Figure 6 we present each network’s predicted hazard ratio along the y-axis and the 
level of asymmetry on the x-axis. We do not present the hazard ratio for the symmetric 
coordination games because there is such a significant difference between the hazard ratios for 
symmetric and asymmetric games that they do not make sense to place on the same figure. This 
means that there is a main effect of asymmetry on the time to solve the coordination game. 
Under asymmetric incentives, the two networks with the lowest nodal degree (cycle and barbell) 
have a much lower hazard ratio, indicating longer times to achieve coordination, than networks 
with more connections. Among the other three networks (Six Chord, Cylinder and Leader) 
increases in asymmetry do cause a decline in the hazard ratio; however, the hazard ratio is 
remains higher than it is among the Cycle and Barbell networks. The Cylinder network maintains 
a much higher hazard ratio (faster coordination) until the bonus reaches $4. These results are 
consistent with our predictions that links between nodes can attenuate the effect of asymmetric 
coordination.  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we present experimental results from embedding standard game theoretic 
models of coordination into a network environment. Our results in this paper shed light on the 
conditions under which network structure affects coordination. Prior empirical suggests that 
there will be a connection between network structure and coordination, but the empirical 
literature cannot determine the causal effect of network structure on coordination. In this paper 
we take the first steps towards understanding how networks affect coordination.  
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Our results demonstrate that with symmetric incentives, many different types of networks 
are quickly and easily solved by subjects. These results mirror those of Kearns et al. (2006), 
despite the fact that we utilized even shorter amounts of time and different networks. In 
particular our results under the symmetric incentive condition suggest that an increase in the 
connectivity of the network leads to faster solutions. One possible way to extend these results is 
to study how human subjects can solve coordination problems when the task becomes more 
complex. Second, our results demonstrate that when we move to asymmetric coordination games 
that better mirror many real-world situations there is a considerable difference between network 
structure and the ability of groups to solve coordination problems. Our experiments reveal that 
more connection in a network can help to overcome asymmetry in a coordination game. This is 
an important result because many real-world coordination situations involve asymmetric payoffs 
and these results may help us to better design networks that can lead to successful coordination.  
Returning to the examples of coordination discussed earlier – electoral politics and policy 
implementation – our results suggest that increasing the density of the network, ceteris paribus, 
can improve coordination. In particular, when coordination is difficult because of asymmetric 
incentives these results suggest that building connections between actors can facilitate 
coordination. For instance, if settings where policy coordination is desirable the results indicate 
that it may be useful to develop institutions that create more connections between various actors. 
As long as these connections do not cause other changes, then they may improve the possibility 
of successful coordination. In addition, our results provide a true causal test of many of the 
claims in the empirical literature about the effect of network connections.  
These results can help us to build better theory about the effect of networks on a wide 
variety of tasks. For example, our results show that the number of connections matter for 
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coordination, but there is also some evidence that the pattern of connections might matter. The 
cylinder network has slightly fewer connections than the leader network, but in the cylinder 
network each node has the exact number of connections. Therefore, coordination may depend 
not just on the number but the distribution of connections. These experiments do not provide a 
full test of this possibility, but the results are interesting and suggestive.  
The results in this paper provide support for the empirical claims that network structure 
affects group coordination. We have only started to understand the conditions when, how and 
why network structure influences group and individual actions. Ultimately, we must improve our 
understanding of dynamic games and networks to help us understand the complex interaction 
between information, networks and individuals’ decisions in experimental and empirical settings.  
21 
 
References 
 
Ahn, T.K., Elinor Ostrom and James Walker. 2003. “Heterogeneous Preferences and 
Collective Action.” Public Choice 117 (3-4) (December 2003): 295-314. 
 
Blume, Andreas and Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: 
Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic 
Theory. Vol. 127(1), pages 274-290 
 
Callander, Steven and Plott, Charles R. 2005. Principles of network development and evolution: 
an experimental study.” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1469–1495 
 
Calvert, Randall. 1992. “Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination” 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 7-24  
 
Camerer, Colin. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Carpenter, Daniel, Kevin Esterling and David Lazer. 2004. “The Strength of Strong Ties: A 
Model of Contact Making in Policy Networks with Evidence from U.S. Health Politics,” 
Rationality and Society. 15(4 November): 411-440. 
 
Charness, Gary & Jackson, Matthew O. 2007. "Group play in games and the role of consent in 
network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 417-445, 
September. 
 
Christakis, Nicholas A and James H. Fowler. 2008. “The Collective Dynamics of Smoking in a 
Large Social Network.” New England Journal of Medicine 358 (21): 2249-58 (22 May 
2008) 
 
Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” The American 
Journal of Sociology. 
 
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge University Press 
Enterline, Andrew J., Israel Stephens, and Kyle Joyce. 2008. “Dyads de novo?  State pair origins 
and international relations.” Presented at the 2008 Networks in Political Science 
Conference, Harvard University. 
Fowler, James H. 2006. “Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks” 
Political Analysis 14 (4): 456-487 (Fall 2006) 
Gelman, Andrew and Jennifer Hill. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and 
Multilevel/Hierarchical Models. Cambridge University Press. 
 
22 
 
Grannovetter, Mark. 1973  "The Strength of Weak Ties."  American Journal of Sociology, 78 
(May): 1360-1380.  
 
______________.  1974  Getting a Job:  A Study of Contacts and Careers.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Goldstein, Harvey. 1999. Multilevel Statistical Models. London: Institute of  Education, 
Multilevel Models Project. 
 
Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom and Barry WEingast. 1994. "Coordination, Commitment and 
Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild."  The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
102, No. 4 
 
Heclo, Hugh. 1978. "Issue networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, ed. 
“The new American political system” American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C. 
Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague.  1987. “Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political 
Information.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec., 1987), pp. 
1197-1216 
 
________________________. 2006. Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Information 
and Influence in an Election Campaign 
 
Jackson, Matthew O. 2008. ``Networks and Economic Behavior,'' October 2008, forthcoming in 
the The Annual Review of Economics  
 
Jensen, Tommy R. and Bjarne Toft. 1994. Graph Coloring Problems. Wiley-Interscience 
 
Kahler, Miles. (E.D.) 2009. Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, forthcoming Spring 2009. 
 
Kearns, M., S. Suri, and N. Montfort. 2006. “An Experimental Study of the Coloring Problem on 
Human Subject Networks.” Science 313(5788), pp. 824-827 
 
Kelly, John and Bruce Etling. 2008. “Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the 
Persian Blogosphere.” Presented at the 2008 Networks in Political Science Conference, 
Harvard University. 
 
Keohane, Robert and Elinor Ostrom. 1994. “Introduction.” Journal of Theoretical Politics. 6, 
403 
 
Koger, Gregory, Seth Masket and Hans Noel. Forthcoming. “Partisan Webs: Information 
Exchange and Party Networks.” British Journal of Political Science. 
 
Knoke, David and Song Yang. 2008. Social Network Analysis: Second Edition. Sage 
Publications.  
23 
 
Laumann, Edward O. and David Knoke. 1987. The Organizational State: Social Choice in 
National Policy Domains. Madison, WI. The University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Lewis, David. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press. 
 
Mackie, Gerry. 1996. “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account.” American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 6. (Dec., 1996), pp. 999-1017 
 
McClurg, Scott D. 2003. “Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social 
Interaction in Explaining Political Participation.” Political Research Quarterly. 56 
(December):448-64. 
 
McConnell, Margaret Anne, Betsy Sinclair and Donald P. Green. 2008. “Detecting Spillover in 
Social Networks: Design and Analysis of Multi-level Experiments” Presented at the 2008 
Networks in Political Science Conference, Harvard University. 
 
Montgomery, Alexander H., Miles Kahler and Emilie M. Hafner-Burton. 2008. “Network 
Analysis for International Relations.” Presented at the 2008 Networks in Political Science 
Conference, Harvard University. 
 
Myerson, Roger. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press. 
 
Nickerson, David W. and Avi Feller. 2008. “Can Voter Turnout Contaminate a Neighborhood?” 
Presented at the 2008 Networks in Political Science Conference, Harvard University. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone. New York: Simon and Schuster.   
 
Scholz, John, Ramiro Berardo and Brad Kile. 2008. “Do Networks Enhance Cooperation? 
Credibility, Search, and Collaboration in Joint Environmental Projects”. Journal of 
Politics 70(2): 393-406 
 
Scholz, John T. and Ramiro Berardo. 2008. “Self-Organizing Policy Networks: Risk, Partner 
Selection and Cooperation in Estuaries.” Presented at the 2008 Networks in Political 
Science Conference, Harvard University. 
 
Trochim, William. 2001. The Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2nd Edition. Atomic Dog 
Publishers, Cincinnatti, OH. 
 
Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Watts, Duncan J. 2003.  Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age. Norton, New York. 
 
24 
 
 
  
25 
 
 
Figure 1: Symmetric Incentive Coordination Game 
 
 Player 2 
Red Green 
Player 1 Red  (0,0) (1, 1) 
Green (1,1) (0,0) 
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Figure 2: Asymmetric Incentive Coordination Game with Red as Bonus Color 
 Player 2 
Red Green 
Player 1 Red  (0, 0) (1 + B, 1) 
Green (1, 1 + B) (0, 0) 
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Figure 3: A Subject’s Screenshot Before Experiment Begins 
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Figure 4: Different Networks Utilized During Experiment 
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Figure 5: Average Time for Coordination Based on Bonus Amount and Connectivity  
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Figure 6: Network Connections Reduce the Impact of Asymmetric Coordination 
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Table 1: Average Degree for each Network 
Network 0-chord 
cycle 
Barbell 6-chord 
cycle 
Cylinder Leader 
Average 
Nodal Degree 
2 2.125 2.75 3 3.625 
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Table 2: Overall Completion and Time Spent on Each Graph Coloring Problem 
Bonus Ratio 0 1 2 3 4 
Proportion of 
Networks Solved and 
Average Time Spent 
on a Trial 
.95  
(18/19) 
31 seconds 
0.50  
(3/6) 
144 
seconds 
0.56 
14/25 
128 
seconds 
 
0.43 
13/30 
149 seconds 
0.25 
6/24 
153 
seconds 
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Table 3: Logit Analysis of Successful Coordination 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
Session count 0.003 (0.08) 
Cycle 0 5.50 (3.15)* 
Barbell 2.19 (1.95) 
Cycle 6 3.06 (2.17) 
Cylinder 7.93 (3.66)** 
Asymmetric Incentives -0.28 (0.61) 
Level of Asymmetry  0.38 (0.79) 
Asymmetry level for Zero Chord -2.51  (1.24)** 
Asymmetry level for Barbell -1.38 (0.78)* 
Asymmetry level for Cycle 6 -0.62 (0.73) 
Asymmetry level for Cylinder -2.19 (1.11)** 
Total Number of Sessions 104 
Number of Groups 4 
*=significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level 
Excluded category for the networks is the leader Network.  
Regression includes group-level fixed effects  
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Table 4: Duration Analysis of Time Until Successful Coordination 
 Hazard Ratio |z statistic| 
Session counter 0.96 (0.78) 
Cycle 0 0.83 (0.46) 
Barbell 0.86 (0.33) 
Cycle 6 1.15 (0.32) 
Cylinder 5.01 (2.21)* 
Bonus  -.14 (3.78)* 
Bonus Ratio 1.15 (0.38) 
Bonus Ratio for Cycle 0 0.60 (3.52)* 
Bonus Ratio for Barbell 0.58 (3.29)* 
Bonus Ratio for Cycle 6 0.96 (0.27) 
Bonus Ratio for Cylinder 0.67 (2.18)* 
Number of Observations 104 
 
Excluded category is the leader network. 
Analysis is stratified by day to account for any day to day variance in ability to solve 
coordination problem. Standard errors are clustered based on the network.  
 
 
